Three Whacks at Wealth Transfer Tax Reform: Retained-Interest Transfers, Generation-Skipping Trusts, and FLP Valuation Discounts by Dodge, Joseph M.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 57
Issue 3 The Centennial of the Estate and Gift Tax:
Perspectives and Recommendations
Article 12
5-26-2016
Three Whacks at Wealth Transfer Tax Reform:
Retained-Interest Transfers, Generation-Skipping
Trusts, and FLP Valuation Discounts
Joseph M. Dodge
Florida State University College of Law, jdodge@law.fsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons, Law and Politics
Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph M. Dodge, Three Whacks at Wealth Transfer Tax Reform: Retained-Interest Transfers,
Generation-Skipping Trusts, and FLP Valuation Discounts, 57 B.C.L. Rev. 999 (2016),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol57/iss3/12
  999 
THREE WHACKS AT WEALTH TRANSFER TAX 
REFORM: RETAINED-INTEREST TRANSFERS, 
GENERATION-SKIPPING TRUSTS, AND FLP 
VALUATION DISCOUNTS 
JOSEPH M. DODGE* 
Abstract: This Article offers three sets of proposals to reform the existing federal 
wealth transfer tax system, the common theme being the link between the timing 
of the taxable transfer and valuation. Under the first set of proposals, transfers 
with retained interests would be taxed at the first to occur of the transferor’s 
death or the date the interest expired. In addition, the term “retained interest” 
would be broadly construed to encompass the power to revoke and the possibility 
of receiving income or corpus under another person’s power. The second set of 
proposals relates to the generation-skipping tax. To achieve accurate valuation, 
the tax would be imposed only on taxable distributions, and the exemptions 
would either be the unused gift/estate exemptions of deemed transferors or sepa-
rate per-transferee exemptions. The third set of proposals relates to valuation dis-
counts of interests in family-held entities, mostly family limited partnerships. 
The lack-of-marketability discount for family investment-holding entities should 
be ignored because the tax-motivated destructions of non-unique value are 
against public policy, and the removal of the value-depressing restrictions is like-
ly to occur in the future. Minority-interest discounts should not be recognized 
where minority status exists by reason of marital property rights or arises by gift 
or bequest. As a transition rule (or as an alternate approach), the disappearance of 
value-depressing restrictions and the recombining of minority interests into a ma-
jority interest should, where valuation discounts were previously obtained, be 
subject to a recapture excise tax.  
INTRODUCTION 
Although this author personally favors replacing the federal wealth trans-
fer (gift/estate/generation-skipping) taxes with an accessions tax,1 Congress 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2016, Joseph M. Dodge. All rights reserved. 
 * Professor Emeritus, Florida State University College of Law. I thank the ACTEC Foundation, 
Boston College Law Review, and participants at this Symposium. 
 1 See Joseph M. Dodge, Replacing the Estate Tax with a Reimagined Accessions Tax, 60 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 997 (2009). An accessions tax is a tax at progressive rates on an individual’s cumulative 
gratuitous receipts, whereas the existing gift/estate tax system is a tax on an individual’s cumulative 
lifetime and death-time gratuitous transfers. 
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has been reluctant to abandon existing tax systems.2 Accordingly, a more real-
istic tack is to address reform of current law. The tax aim of a wealth transfer 
tax is to raise some revenue with reasonable efficiency and minimal economic 
distortion. The non-tax aim is to curb undue accumulations of unearned, gra-
tuitously received wealth by individuals. Since about 1980, the wealth transfer 
taxes have not done a very good job in terms of their aims. The post-1980 pe-
riod has seen an increase in wealth inequalities among classes, especially at the 
very top,3 that has coincided with a drastic weakening of the wealth transfer 
taxes—both by legislation4 and the failure to address loopholes that are ex-
ploited by transactions that make little or no sense apart from tax avoidance.5 
That the wealth transfer tax is barely alive politically,6 despite being limited to 
about 0.1% of decedents,7 is itself a symptom of the undue concentration of 
wealth and political influence. 
Despite the bleak short-term prospects for reform, the political climate 
could change, and that possibility makes it worthwhile to advance some pro-
posals. This Article concentrates on three problem areas that revolve around 
the timing of the taxable event. The overriding thesis is that timing rules 
should be the servant of accurate (i.e., ex post) valuations of the taxable trans-
fers. Part I proposes a hard-to-complete approach for gifts under which income 
and corpus will (or can) return to the donor.8 Part II proposes that the current 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Congress has declined to replace or supplement the existing income tax with a cash-flow con-
sumption tax or a value-added tax despite strong advocacy and political support, especially for the 
former. 
 3 See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 
993, 998–1012 (2004) (discussing the growing income gap and concentration of wealth in the United 
States); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evi-
dence from Capitalized Income Tax Data 37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
20,625, 2014), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW4V-ETDM] 
(noting that wealth inequality is rising and is reaching levels last seen in 1929). 
 4 The wealth transfer tax provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 retroactively 
repealed the carryover basis rule of the income tax, replaced the generation-skipping tax with an inef-
fective alternative, reduced the top tax rates, and accelerated a trend in which the exemption levels 
increased much faster than the rate of inflation. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 5 Congress has done nothing to curb such notorious tax-motivated transactions as grantor-retained 
annuity trusts (“GRATs”), private annuities for the terminally ill, Crummey powers, and family in-
vestment-holding entities. 
 6 Congress repealed the estate and generation-skipping taxes for otherwise taxable transfers oc-
curring in 2010. For an account of political hostility (or indifference) to the wealth transfer taxes, see 
generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER 
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005). 
 7 In 2015, decedents are estimated to have 3700 taxable estates, which is about 0.12% of the total 
decedent population. See Laura Saunders, Estate Tax Exemption for 2015 Is Announced, WALL 
STREET J.: TOTAL RETURN (Oct. 30, 2014, 12:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2014/10/30/
estate-tax-exemption-for-2015-announced-by-irs [https://perma.cc/E46A-TEMR]. 
 8 See infra notes 11–74 and accompanying text. 
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generation-skipping tax be replaced by one imposed only upon taxable distri-
butions; three alternative solutions are proposed for determining rates and ex-
emptions.9 Part III deals with the imposition, and later lapse or removal, of tax-
motivated restrictions on property obtained by using legal entities (such as 
family limited partnerships, or “FLPs”) to hold investment property.10 
I. TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS AND POWERS11 
The essential characteristic of an inter vivos wealth transfer with a retained 
interest or power in the transferred property (a “string” or “hybrid” transfer)12 is 
that the transferor has not parted with all incidents of ownership over the proper-
ty.13 The issue is whether the transfer should be taxed in whole or in part under 
the gift tax when initially made, or at a later time when the retained interest or 
power terminates, which can occur no later than the transferor’s death.14 The 
correct solution is to tax retained-interest transfers (broadly construed to include 
powers to revoke and possibilities of receiving back income or corpus) when the 
interest expires, but otherwise to tax transfers when made. 
A. Problems with Existing Law 
The 1916 estate tax and later (1924, 1932) gift tax15 were never fully in 
sync with respect to string transfers. The estate tax aimed to include “testamen-
tary” hybrid transfers in the gross estate,16 and the gift tax reached gifts of 
property or interests therein (valued using actuarial tables)17 that were “com-
plete” (not subject to a retained power to revoke, alter, or amend).18 In the 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See infra notes 75–119 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 120–204 and accompanying text. 
 11 This Part is an adaptation and modification of Joseph M. Dodge, Retained Interest Transfers 
Under the Estate and Gift Tax, 133 TAX NOTES 235 (2011). 
 12 An interest or power in property is “retained” if the transferor still has the interest or power 
following the transfer. 
 13 See Dodge, supra note 11, at 235. 
 14 See id. Because a power is personal and does not survive the power-holder’s death, it cannot be 
transferred by gift or bequest. With respect to interests in property, the timing issue arises only for 
those that must lapse or terminate at or prior to the transferor’s death (such as income interests). 
 15 Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, §§ 200–12, 39 Stat. 756, 777–80 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, 
§§ 501–32, 47 Stat. 169, 245–59 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Revenue 
Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319–24, 43 Stat. 253, 313–16 (repealed 1926). 
 16 The 1916 statute included in the gross estate inter vivos transfers by a decedent “intended to 
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after [the transferor’s] death,” as well as certain other 
lifetime-generated transfers. Revenue Act of 1916 § 202(b). 
 17 See I.R.C. § 7520 (2012) (actuarial tables generally required in valuation of interests); Treas. 
Reg. § 25.2511-1(e), (h)(7) (1997) (value of retained interests subtracted from value of transferred 
property); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(a) (2011) (actuarial valuation).  
 18 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (1999). 
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meantime, the estate tax string-transfer provision evolved into current Internal 
Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) §§ 2036–2038.19 Under these provisions, an inter 
vivos transfer (or a portion thereof)20 is included in the gross estate if the trans-
feror retains: (1) possession or enjoyment of the property or an income right 
therein,21 (2) a reversion which, just prior to the transferor’s death, is worth 
more than five percent of the value of the property,22 or (3) a power to alter the 
beneficial enjoyment of income or to revoke, alter, or amend the transfer.23 In 
1990, Congress added § 2702, which treats certain, but not all, retained inter-
ests as having a zero value for gift tax purposes.24 Thus, certain non-gifts are 
treated as gifts!25 
The independent doctrines under the gift and estate taxes sometimes re-
sult in the double taxation of the same transfer, which in turn necessitates rules 
aimed to mitigate the same.26 In general, the relevant statutory provisions have 
generated a vast quantity of confusing and arcane doctrine27 not clearly derived 
from the statutory language28 and insensitive to tax avoidance.29 
                                                                                                                           
 19 I.R.C. §§ 2036–2038 (2012). Section 2036(b) was added in 1978, but is peripheral to the 
themes of the proposal made herein. Id. § 2036(b). 
 20 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(c)(1)(i) (2011). Under § 2037, the amount included is the estate 
tax value of those interests in the property (if any) that are contingent on surviving the decedent (ex-
cluding the value, if any, of the retained reversion). Dodge, supra note 11, at 236 n.10; see Treas. Reg. 
§ 20.2037-1(e) ex. 3 (1958). Under § 2038, the amount included is only the interest subject to the 
power to alter, amend, or terminate. Dodge, supra note 11, at 236 n.10; see Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) 
(1962) (“However, only the value of an interest in property subject to a power to which section 2038 
applies is included in the decedent’s gross estate under section 2038.”). 
 21 See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1). 
 22 See id. § 2037(a)(2). In addition, it must also be the case that possession or enjoyment of the 
property can only be obtained by surviving the decedent. See id. § 2037(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-
1(b), (e) exs. 1 & 3. 
23 See Dodge, supra note 11, at 236; see also I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2), 2038. 
 24 See I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2), 2038. 
 25 See id. § 2702 (2012). Normally, the value of retained interests is subtracted from the value of 
the property that is the subject of the gift. See id. § 7520; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e), (h)(7); Treas. 
Reg. § 25.2512-5(a). By treating the retained interest as having a zero value, the entire property is 
treated as a gift. 
 26 See I.R.C. § 2001(b) (2012) (eliminating transfers included in the gross estate from the catego-
ry of “adjusted taxable gifts,” which, along with the taxable estate, constitutes the final gift/estate tax 
cumulative tax base). If property transferred is included in the gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036(a), the 
§ 2702 deemed gift of the retained-income interest remains in the adjusted taxable gifts total. See id. 
§§ 2036(a), 2702. 
 27 For a general discussion of string-transfer doctrine, see JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL 
TAXES ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: LAW AND PLANNING 114–17, 199–201, 369–454, 469–72, 488–
500 (2011). 
 28 For example, nothing in the text of §§ 2036–2038 suggests that a retained power subject to a 
“standard” (such as “support” or “comfort”) is not covered by these sections. See I.R.C. §§ 2036–
2038. An additional example is the meaning of the “survivorship” requirement of § 2037(a)(1). See id. 
§ 2037(a)(1). 
 29 See Dodge, supra note 11, at 236. 
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B. Congress Should Focus on Fully Taxing Gratuitous Transfers 
Congress should revamp string-transfer doctrine both for the sake of sim-
plification and to more efficiently focus on real tax-avoidance scenarios, as 
opposed to continuing to pursue the property-law-oriented “testamentary trans-
fer” concept. 
1. Retained Current-Enjoyment Transfers 
The greatest opportunities for tax avoidance lie with retained current-
enjoyment transfers. 
a. The Stakes 
A remainder-interest gift subject to a retained current-enjoyment interest 
for life or a period of years increases in value with the passage of time, even if 
the underlying property does not. The discrepancy between the value of the 
gift when made and when complete is compounded if the underlying property 
appreciates or is held in an accumulation trust. To illustrate, suppose Jane (age 
32) creates a trust with securities worth $1 million, income to herself for life 
and remainder to Bill.30 The value of the gifted remainder interest is about 
$200,000 (using 4%-discount-rate actuarial tables).31 Jane receives trust in-
come until her death, at which time the property is still worth $1 million. If the 
only taxing date is the date of the gift, $200,000 would be subject to gift tax. If 
the taxing date is the date of Jane’s death, $1 million would be subject to (es-
tate) tax. Thus, if the property is not included in Jane’s gross estate, Jane will 
have succeeded in removing $800,000 from her gift/estate tax base, while con-
tinuing to enjoy the property for life. If the property appreciates to $2.5 million 
at Jane’s death, she will have removed $2.3 million from her tax base. 
Taxing the Jane-Bill transaction only under the gift tax (and not under the 
estate tax) would be to adopt an unnecessary ex ante approach, in that the 
transfer can be taxed when the shift in possession or enjoyment becomes final 
(i.e., at Jane’s death). Additionally, the ex ante approach, which relies on actu-
arial tables, is bound to be inaccurate, because: (1) actuarial tables are only 
predictions of future events, and (2) the tables are based on mortality statistics 
for the entire population without regard to the tax-planning context. Thus, if 
the tables assume that a person of Jane’s age (32) will live to age 85, the dis-
count period is taken to be 53 years. But if Jane actually dies at age 62, the 
actuarial estimate will turn out to have been wrong in a way that favors Jane, 
because an accurate longevity calculation would have produced a higher taxa-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See id. 
 31 The higher the discount rate, the lower the value of the remainder interest; thus, if the discount 
rate were 8%, the same gift would be worth only about $61,000! See id. 
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ble amount. Estate planners understand numbers, and would recommend a re-
mainder-interest gift only for one expected to underperform her statistical life 
expectancy.32 
Additionally, the tables systematically undervalue remainders33 by ignor-
ing appreciation. The true actuarial value of a remainder interest in a trust is 
the present value of the amount expected to be in the trust at the date the re-
mainder interest is expected to come into possession, but the tables apply the 
discount rate against the amount presently transferred. This assumes (contrary 
to the mandates of trust law, portfolio theory, and interest-rate theory) that 
none of the economic return will inure to the corpus (the remainder interest),34 
whereas Jane (in a tax-planning mode) would favor a maximum allocation of 
economic return to corpus.35 
b. The Economics of Retained Current-Enjoyment Transfers 
In the Jane-Bill example, transfers of value occur from Jane to Bill in 
three stages.36 First, a gift of the remainder interest occurs immediately. Next, 
gratuitous transfers occur over time from the retained current-enjoyment inter-
est to the remainder interest.37 Third, upon the termination of the retained cur-
rent-enjoyment interest at Jane’s death, Bill accedes to the full value of the 
property.38 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Courts assert that use of actuarial tables is “neutral” because transferors are equally likely to 
outperform, as well as to underperform, their life expectancies. See Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 
279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929); Estate of D’Ambrosio v. Comm’r, 101 F.3d 309, 317 (3d Cir. 1996). This 
attitude ignores the reality of estate planning. 
 33 See Dodge, supra note 11, at 237. Although the operation of actuarial tables undervalues re-
mainder interests in present-value terms, it should be noted that actuarial valuation results in the reck-
oning of 100% of the value of the underlying property. In contrast, applying a willing-buyer, willing-
seller approach to the valuation of trust interests would entail a reckoning of significantly less than 
100% of the value of the underlying property, because the market value of trust interests is significant-
ly discounted on account of the thinness of the market, actuarial and investment risks, and non-
liquidity, or may be zero due to restrictions on alienation. 
 34 Trust law mandates impartiality between current beneficiaries and remainders, meaning an 
equitable apportionment of benefits and burdens. Accordingly, trustees should look to the total portfo-
lio return. Interest (discount) rates would factor in anticipated inflation, but the tables assume incor-
rectly that none of the inflation return would accrue to principal (as might occur with a bond-only 
portfolio). 
 35 A debatable bias in the actuarial tables is that the stipulated discount rate may be too high, in 
which case remainder interests would be further undervalued. I.R.C. § 7520 requires that the discount 
rate used in actuarial tables be 120% of the applicable federal rate, which is the (low) rate for safe 
Treasury bills. See I.R.C. § 7520. 
 36 See Dodge, supra note 11, at 239. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See id. 
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The economic-transfer concept has precedent in tax provisions providing 
for accrual of original-issue discount39 and imputation of gift and interest 
transfers in the context of certain below-market loans.40 
c. The Hard-to-Complete Approach Fully Captures the Amount Transferred 
In a retained-current-interest gift, all transfers of economic value occur 
“away from” the donor, and they occur by reason of the donor’s gift of a re-
mainder interest while retaining a current-enjoyment interest. Additionally, the 
donor is in full control of how the arrangement is structured. The estate and 
gift tax needs to capture the gratuitous transfer to its full extent.41 This aim can 
only—and easily—be accomplished by a so-called “hard-to-complete” rule, 
which eschews present-value calculations based on guesstimates of future 
events.42 That is, the transfer would be complete (for estate or gift tax purpos-
es) at the earlier to occur of the expiration or transfer of the retained current-
enjoyment interest or the transferor’s death.43 For the sake of administrative 
convenience, the initial transfer would not be subject to gift tax, nor would 
annual passage-of-time transfers. 
If the hard-to-complete approach were adopted, then § 2035(a), which 
treats gifts of retained interests within three years of death as being ineffective 
to defeat § 2036, would serve no purpose and would be repealed.44 
d. Section 2702 Is the Wrong Response 
Congress took the wrong path by enacting § 2702 in 1990, as a response 
to the tax-avoidance device known as the “grantor retained-income trust” 
(“GRIT”).45 The GRIT follows the format of the gift of the Jane-Bill trust, ex-
cept that Jane retains her income interest for a period expected to lapse before 
her death, in which eventuality the transferred property avoids estate inclu-
sion.46 Section 2702 provides that the retained interest is deemed to be worth 
zero for gift tax purposes, resulting in a deemed gift of the retained interest as 
well as of non-retained interests,47 but does not alter the estate tax result. 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See id.; see also I.R.C. § 1272 (2012). 
 40 I.R.C. § 7872 (2012). 
 41 Dodge, supra note 11, at 239–40. 
 42 Id. at 240. 
 43 See id. at 241. 
 44 I.R.C. § 2035(a) (2012); see id. § 2036. 
 45 See id. § 2702. 
 46 The transfer of the retained interest within three years of the decedent’s death would cause 
estate inclusion under § 2035(a), but a lapse is not a “transfer.” See id. § 2035(a). If the retained inter-
est lapses before the grantor’s death, then the interest was not retained for the grantor’s life, for a 
period not ascertainable without reference to the grantor’s death, or for a period that did not in fact 
end before the grantor’s death, as required by § 2036(a). See id. § 2036(a). 
 47 Id. § 2702(a)(2)(A); see Dodge, supra note 11, at 241. 
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Section 2702 contains exceptions for (1) certain retained annuity and 
unitrust interests, (2) a personal residence trust,48 and (3) cases where the do-
nees are not family members, meaning an ancestor, descendant, sibling, or 
spouse of the foregoing or of the grantor.49 Thus, GRITs are still allowed for 
non-family members, a GRIT-equivalent (the personal residence trust) is al-
lowed even for family members, and the inside build-up is untaxed. The most 
popular form of transfer excepted from § 2702 is the short-term grantor-
retained annuity trust (“GRAT”).50 GRATs not only avoid § 2702 but also min-
imize exposure to § 2036(a)(1).51  
Ideally, property expected to generate a high rate of return will fund the 
short-term GRAT. For example, suppose Gramps creates a GRAT with $1 mil-
lion generating a ten percent rate of return, retaining a two-year annuity of 
$520,000 each year for two years, remainder to Junior. After year 1, the trust 
will have $580,000 ((1.1 x $1 million) - $520,000). At the end of year 2, the 
trust will have $118,000 ((1.1 x $580,000) - $520,000). Junior will end up with 
the $118,000 after two years, but Gramps will be charged with a gift of only 
$19,000, using a four percent discount rate. Gramps can recycle the annuity 
distributions into new GRATs.52 GRITs, GRATs, and grantor-retained unitrusts 
(“GRUTs”) would not exist in the absence of the gift/estate tax. A retained cur-
rent-enjoyment transfer only makes economic sense as insuring against the risk 
of longevity while preserving a fund for the natural objects of one’s bounty. A 
retained interest intended to expire before death serves no dispositive purpose. 
The proposed hard-to-complete rule would foreclose these transactions. 
In the Jane-Bill example, Jane’s estate would be taxed on the value of the trust 
on Jane’s death. In the Gramps-Junior example, Gramps would be subject to 
gift tax on $118,000 when his term interest expires. 
e. Grantor-as-Beneficiary Trusts 
Property law (and current tax law) does not consider a retained possibility 
of obtaining income in the trustee’s discretion as a retained “interest.”53 Never-
theless, for transfer tax purposes it should be so considered, because the re-
mainder interest (again) increases in value with the passage of time, and the 
transfer can be accurately valued only when the remainder comes into posses-
                                                                                                                           
 48 See I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii), (b). 
 49 See I.R.C. §§ 2702(e), 2704(c)(2) (2012). 
 50 See Dodge, supra note 11, at 237. 
 51 See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1); see also Dodge, supra note 11, at 237. 
 52 See Dodge, supra note 11, at 237–38. 
 53 See Comm’r v. Irving Tr. Co., 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945) (involving the predecessor of I.R.C. 
§ 2037). Also, the grantor is not here considered as having a retained interest either under the gift tax, 
see Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e), or under I.R.C. § 2702. 
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sion. Moreover, income not distributed to the grantor increases the amounts 
gratuitously transferred from the grantor to present and future beneficiaries. 
f. Sale of Remainder Interest 
Another tax-motivated technique is one involving the sale of a remainder 
interest in property. Assume the same facts as the Jane-Bill example, except 
that, instead of a trust, Jane sells a remainder interest in Blackacre (worth $1 
million) to Bill for an amount equal to the actuarial value of the interest (say, 
$200,000). Because this is a sale of an interest for full and adequate considera-
tion, no gift occurs, in the absence of § 2702.54 The courts have held that this 
type of transaction avoids § 2036(a) by reason of having been a sale for full 
and adequate consideration in money or money’s worth.55 The appeal of this 
transaction would be muted if § 2702 applied, in which case the value of the 
retained interest ($800,000) would be treated as a gift; but § 2702 is avoided if 
Bill is not a family member or some other exception applies.56 Under the hard-
to-complete rule, the initial transfer would be incomplete, and the value of the 
property at Jane’s death would be included in her gross estate with a partial 
consideration offset of $200,000.57 At the time of sale, the ultimate outcome is 
speculative. At Jane’s death, it is evident that Jane’s net transfer is the then-
value of Blackacre less $200,000. It cannot be assumed that the $200,000 ac-
tually increased Jane’s probate estate by an amount equal to the date-of-death 
value of Blackacre. Just because present-value analysis can be applied at the 
time of sale, it does not follow that it must dictate the “final” tax result—or 
even should dictate it. The growth of Bill’s remainder interest is inevitable; the 
fate of the $200,000 is subject to intervening cause. 
g. Private Annuities 
Another tax-motivated transaction under existing law involves the ex-
change of property with a related party in return for a non-secured promise to 
make fixed-amount payments until the transferor’s death.58 The payments are 
set so that (using the applicable actuarial annuity factor) the present value of 
the payment stream equals the fair market value of the property transferred. 
This results in a zero net gift59 and (under current law) is not a retained-interest 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See I.R.C. § 2702. 
 55 E.g., Estate of D’Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 312; see I.R.C. § 2036(a). 
 56 See I.R.C. § 2702; Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-4(d) ex. 2 (1992). 
 57 The rule that the consideration should be fixed at $200,000 for estate tax purposes is correct. 
United States v. Righter, 400 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1968). The notion that Bill has purchased a 20% in-
terest in Jane’s property (resulting in an inclusion of 80% of the value thereof at Jane’s death) is 
counter-factual, and a tracing rule would be unworkable. 
 58 Dodge, supra note 11, at 238. 
 59 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1992). 
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transfer because a money claim is not treated as a retained interest “in” the 
transferred property.60 This type of transaction—called either a private annuity 
or a self-cancelling installment note (“SCIN”)61—appears, on its face, to re-
move only future appreciation from the transferor’s gross estate. Yet, if the 
transferor dies prematurely, her right to payment will also terminate premature-
ly, and (with the benefit of hindsight) the consideration received will turn out 
to have been grossly undervalued.  
As an example, if Delilah (age sixty) transfers Blackacre worth $1 mil-
lion to Elizabeth in return for a promise to pay Delilah $92,354 a year for Deli-
lah’s life, the value of the promise will equal $1 million (using the six percent 
tables). But if Delilah dies one year later, the value of the consideration that 
replenished Delilah’s estate will have turned out to have been worth only 
$87,126 (meaning that with hindsight, the gift amount should have been 
$912,874). Not surprisingly, this device appears to be used exclusively by per-
sons who are expected to underperform their actuarial life expectancy.62 
The hard-to-complete rule should cover this type of transaction. The re-
tained payment right is derivative of the transfer of property. No transaction of 
this sort exists in commerce: no seller would take back an unsecured obliga-
tion, and no buyer would undertake the obligation to make substantial cash 
payments to a stranger subject to the actuarial risk of the seller’s longevity. 
2. Transfers That Can Be Returned to the Transferor 
Current law correctly applies a hard-to-complete rule for revocable trans-
fers.63 A transfer with a retained power to revoke is not a meaningful transfer 
of ownership. Treating such a transfer as a non-gift (by reason of being an in-
complete transfer) helps transferors by preventing the same property from be-
ing taxed twice—first upon transfer, and again if the transfer is revoked and 
appears in the transferor’s probate estate. 
Current law should be modified to treat a transfer as being incomplete 
even where the revocation power is held jointly with an adverse party.64 Fur-
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Fidelity-Phila. Tr. Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274 (1958). 
 61 A SCIN is a fixed-term obligation that terminates at the seller’s death. It avoids gift tax expo-
sure only if the periodic payments are increased sufficiently to offset the actuarial risk of death during 
the term. 
 62 Dodge, supra note 11, at 238; see Estate of Fabric v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 932, 941–43 (1984). 
Section 7520 requires use of the actuarial tables in all cases except where the person is ill with an 
incurable disease such that that there is at least a 50% chance of death within one year of the transfer. 
Dodge, supra note 11, at 238 n.27; see Treas. Reg. § 25.7520-3(b)(3) (2011). 
 63 The transfer is an incomplete gift, but distributions to third parties are gifts, and the lapse or 
release of the revocation power entails a gift if it occurs before the transferor’s death. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 25.2511-2(f). 
 64 See id. § 25.2511-2(e). This rule was applied in Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F.2d 331, 335–36 
(1st Cir. 1940), in spite of the court’s acknowledgment that “at the time of the creation of the trust 
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thermore, a transfer should be deemed incomplete in cases where the corpus 
can be distributed to the donor under a distribution power held by another per-
son, even if that power is limited by such standards as “support” or “com-
fort.”65 In both scenarios, the interests and expectations of persons other than 
the transferor are on hold until the power expires (or is released) or distribu-
tions are actually received. 
3. Retained-Reversion Transfers 
Systematic tax avoidance does not appear to be a problem with retained-
reversion transfers, because reversions increase in value with the passage of 
time. Nevertheless, retained-reversion transfers resemble revocable transfers 
where the reversion might come into possession prior to the grantor’s death, 
raising the specter of double taxation.66 In cases where the reversion might 
lapse or be cut off at, or prior to, the grantor’s death, such lapse would entail a 
wealth transfer from the grantor to those whose interests are augmented by 
such lapse. Current law in this area (especially § 2037) is excessively com-
plex,67 and involves the use of actuarial tables for both gift and estate tax pur-
poses.68 
                                                                                                                           
there might be extraneous considerations, whether of a pecuniary or sentimental nature, which would 
give the donor every confidence that such designated beneficiary would acquiesce in any future desire 
of the donor to withdraw the gift, in whole or in part.” See also Camp v. Comm’r, 195 F.2d 999, 1004 
(1st Cir. 1952). 
 65 See Dodge, supra note 11, at 240. 
 66 If the transferor reacquires the property during life, it (to the extent not consumed) will be sub-
ject again to gift/estate tax, with no relief from double taxation. Even if the reversion does not come 
into possession, double taxation might occur under current law. The reversion (possibly subject to gift 
tax under § 2702) may be included under § 2033 or the remainder might be included under § 2037, 
but only in the latter case is the twice-taxed remainder interest taken out of the “adjusted taxable gifts” 
amount. See I.R.C. § 2033 (2012); id. §§ 2037, 2702. 
 67 See id. § 2037. Section 2037 requires that “possession or enjoyment of the property . . . be 
obtained only by surviving the decedent.” Id. § 2037(a)(1). The meaning of this “survivorship” re-
quirement can only be gleaned by consulting the regulations and case law. An example is an inter 
vivos trust transfer by D, income to L for life, reversion to D if D survives L, but if not remainder to R. 
Here, if D predeceases L, R’s remainder interest is contingent on D’s death (before L’s death). Section 
2037 also requires the reversion to be worth more than 5% at the moment just prior to the grantor’s 
death, disregarding the fact that the grantor actually died when he did. Id. § 2037. This needs both a 
calculation of the chances that D would outlive L (a factor not provided by the actuarial tables) and the 
reduction of D’s reversion to present value. See infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 68 Assume a trust transfer by D, income to L for life, reversion to D. Under current law, the entire 
transfer is subject to gift tax if § 2702 applies; otherwise, actuarial tables will be used to value the gift 
to L. See I.R.C. § 2702. And, if D predeceases L, actuarial tables must be used in valuing D’s rever-
sion, included in D’s gross estate under § 2033. See id. § 2033. Assume, alternatively, that in the same 
hypothetical the reversion is to D if D outlives L, but if not, remainder to R. Again the entire transfer 
is a gift if § 2702 applies; otherwise, actuarial tables are used. See id. § 2702. Nevertheless, here the 
application requires the expertise of an actuary, because the likelihood that D will outlive L must be 
factored in. As noted supra note 67, if D predeceases L, § 2037 comes into play. First, actuarial tables 
must be used to determine if § 2037’s 5% requirement is satisfied. See supra note 67 and accompany-
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Generally, a retained-reversion transfer should be viewed as being in-
complete; distributions to beneficiaries during the grantor’s lifetime would be 
completed gifts from the grantor. If the grantor reacquires ownership, so be it. 
If not, the full value of the property should be included in the grantor’s gross 
estate, as it consists of a future completed transfer to persons either designated 
under the governing instrument or ascertainable under a reversion to the gran-
tor’s “estate.” This approach achieves simplicity and accuracy, avoiding both 
double taxation and transfers valued inaccurately under the actuarial tables. 
However, an easy-to-complete rule is appropriate for the rare case in which the 
retained reversion cannot come into possession before the grantor’s death and 
cannot lapse at or before such death.69 
4. Transfers with Retained Powers to Alter, Amend, or Terminate 
Under current law, the estate tax retained-power rules are mostly toothless 
due to case law,70 but they can be a trap for the unwary, because a power to 
alter may exist if the grantor is a co-trustee sharing powers not sufficiently lim-
ited by ascertainable standards. At the same time, the retention of such powers 
under the gift tax allows the grantor to control the timing of gifts and maxim-
ize the use of the gift tax annual exclusion.71 
On the merits, these retained-power transfers should be deemed to be 
complete when made. Under a gift/estate tax, what matters is parting complete-
ly with the possibility of receiving all or a portion of the property back. In fact, 
the subjective value to the transferor of being able to affect beneficial enjoy-
ment does not possess quantifiable economic value, and it follows that the re-
tention of a dispositive power does not cause value to pass from the transferor 
to the collective objects of her bounty with the passage of time.72 The transfer-
or’s death only affects how the beneficiaries, as a group, will divide up the 
property. 
                                                                                                                           
ing text. Second, if § 2037 applies, the includible amount is the estate tax value of the trust reduced by 
the actuarial value of L’s outstanding income interest, which may be overvalued if L underperforms 
her life expectancy. See I.R.C. § 2037. 
 69 An example would be a trust expected to last beyond the grantor’s death, followed by several 
contingent remainders, but a reversion (implied by law) if all such remainders fail. Because this type 
of reversion is inadvertent, the transfer is likely to be treated as a gift of the full value of the property. 
 70 See, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972); Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 
1947); see also Dodge, supra note 11, at 241. 
 71 Gifts subject to a retained power to alter or amend are incomplete, but distributions to beneficiar-
ies other than the grantor are completed gifts from the donor in the year of distribution that are present-
interest gifts under § 2503(b). See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b)–(c), (f); see also I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2012). 
 72 Dodge, supra note 11, at 241. 
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5. Employee Survivor Benefits and Survivor Annuities 
Section 2039 (modeled after § 2036(a)(1)) currently governs the inclusion 
of employee survivor benefits and commercial annuities in the gross estate.73 It 
should be amended to eliminate the retained-interest requirement. The survivor 
benefit and the retirement (or current annuity) benefits are not mutually de-
pendent interests in property, as is the case with a retained-income trust. Nev-
ertheless, the survivor benefit is always a gratuitous transfer from the employ-
ee or annuity purchaser, whose labor or cash premiums generate the benefit. It 
is best to tax the transfer when its value can be accurately determined, that is, 
on the transferor’s death.74 
II. GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS 
A generation-skipping transfer (“GST”) tax imposes an excise tax on gra-
tuitous transfers from a transferor to a person (referred to as a “skip person”) 
who is two or more generations below that of the transferor.75 The current GST 
tax, however, is counterproductive by actually encouraging the creation of dy-
nastic trusts, relative to a series of outright bequests. One approach is to aim 
for tax neutrality between successive-interest trust transfers and a series of out-
right bequests. The technical difficulties raised by such an approach can be 
finessed by an alternative (limited accessions tax) approach of taxing skip per-
sons directly on distributions over a certain exempt amount. A third approach 
is to discourage dynastic trusts by imposing a trust tax on amounts distributed 
to skip persons or held in trust as a downward generational shift occurs.  
A. Nature and History of the GST Tax 
The first federal GST tax, enacted in 1976,76 was imposed on any taxable 
termination (the expiration of an interest held by intermediate-generation bene-
ficiaries) or taxable distribution (a distribution to a skip person prior to a taxa-
                                                                                                                           
 73 See I.R.C. § 2039(a) (2012) (providing “if . . . an annuity or other payment was payable to the 
decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to receive such annuity or payment . . . for his life”); see 
also id. § 2036(a)(1). 
 74 This analysis suggests, perhaps, that a mandatory accumulation trust, or a trust that reserves 
in the grantor the power to accumulate income should be subject to a hard-to-complete rule, on the 
ground that beneficial enjoyment will be delayed, or might be delayed at the grantor’s will, so that 
the accumulations are essentially additional gifts by the grantor. This is a judgment call. Also, line-
drawing issues are raised as to whether any such hard-to-complete rule should extend to accumula-
tion powers held by persons other than the grantor. 
 75 See I.R.C. § 2613 (2012). 
 76 Tax on Certain Generation-Skipping Transfers, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1879 (1976) (add-
ing former §§ 2601–2622 to the I.R.C.); see, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Generation-Skipping Transfers 
After the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1265, 1268–71 (1977). 
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ble termination) from a trust or trust equivalent.77 To illustrate, suppose T cre-
ated a testamentary trust with income or corpus in the trustee’s discretion pay-
able to or among T’s issue until the death of T’s last surviving child, remainder 
to T’s then-surviving issue. A distribution to a child of T was not a GST, as 
such child is not a skip person, but a distribution to a grandchild prior to the 
termination of the trust was a taxable distribution. A taxable termination oc-
curred upon the death of T’s last surviving child. A GST was treated as a taxa-
ble gift or estate transfer of a “deemed transferor,”78 defined as the descendant 
of the initial transferor that is the parent of the transferee acceding to the gen-
eration-skipping transfer.79 
In 1986, the 1976 GST tax was repealed retroactively and replaced by the 
current GST tax,80 which reaches not only taxable terminations and distribu-
tions but also “direct skip” transfers (such as outright gift and estate transfers 
to skip persons).81 GSTs are not attributed to deemed transferors, but instead 
are taxable separately at a rate calculated by multiplying the maximum 
gift/estate tax rate by the “inclusion ratio.”82 This ratio is equal to 100% minus 
the exclusion percentage. The exclusion percentage’s numerator is the trans-
feror’s GST exemption that is allocated to the transfer (this is separate and 
apart from the gift/estate tax unified transfer tax credit but equal in amount to 
the exemption equivalent of such credit),83 and its denominator is the value of 
the net transfer.84 Thus, if (1) the trust described in the preceding paragraph 
was funded with a $5 million bequest (producing no gift/estate tax because of 
the unified transfer tax credit), (2) T’s GST tax exemption amount is $5 mil-
lion, and (3) all of such amount is allocated to the transfer, then the exclusion 
percentage is 100%, so that all GSTs (even if totaling more than $5 million) 
would incur a tax rate of zero as a result of the inclusion ratio being zero 
(100% - 100% = 0%)! 
B. Rationale for a GST Tax 
The original rationale of a GST tax is presumably to create outcome pari-
ty (horizontal equity) for a scenario in which two transferors, A and X, respec-
tively bequeath, say, $10 million in wealth. In this example, A bequeaths the 
$10 million outright to child C, who in due course bequeaths the same $10 mil-
                                                                                                                           
 77 I.R.C. §§ 2611(a), 2613 (1976). 
 78 I.R.C. § 2602 (1976). 
 79 I.R.C. § 2612 (1976). 
 80 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (adding current chapter 13, 
§§ 2601–2663, to the I.R.C.). 
 81 I.R.C. §§ 2611–2612 (2012). 
 82 I.R.C. § 2641 (2012). 
 83 I.R.C. § 2631 (2012). 
 84 I.R.C. § 2642(a) (2012). 
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lion intact to grandchild G (resulting in two impositions of estate tax). By con-
trast, X uses the $10 million to create a generation-skipping trust with income 
to child Y for life and remainder to grandchild Z (resulting in one imposition of 
estate and gift tax). In this scenario, a GST tax imposes a second tax on X’s 
trust on the death of Y. Whether this rationale—or any other—is convincing is 
not thoroughly addressed herein;85 this Part simply assumes that an effective 
GST tax is desirable, if it can be made workable. 
C. Problems with the Existing GST Tax 
The existing GST tax suffers from several defects.86 The first is the sepa-
rate GST exemption—apart from the transferor’s gift/estate tax exemption and 
apart from the exemptions of the trust beneficiaries. Suppose T has $5 million 
of taxable wealth, all bequeathed to a trust with income to child C for life and 
remainder to grandchild G. The trust is fully exempt from T’s estate tax and 
from all GST tax. Assume that the trust does not appreciate but has an annual 
yield of four percent that is distributed to C periodically. If C lives for twenty-
five years, she will obtain $5 million of trust distributions. Let us assume this 
incremental wealth is saved by C and bequeathed intact to T’s grandchild G. 
This results in G receiving C’s $5 million of saved trust income free of estate 
and gift tax—plus another $5 million from the trust free of GST (and estate) 
tax. In contrast, if the same wealth had passed by successive outright transfer, 
the $10 million obtained by G from C would have only captured C’s $5 million 
estate tax exemption. 
The second defect is that the transferor’s separate exemption replicates it-
self at each generation, because the exemption operates as a reduction (perhaps 
to a zero rate) that applies to all successive GSTs for the life of the trust. 
Meanwhile, the gift/estate tax exemptions of trust beneficiaries remain intact. 
The third defect is that in reducing the rate (perhaps to zero), the exemp-
tion expands as the trust increases in value. Thus, the GST-exempt trust creat-
ed by T described above, initially worth $5 million, is exempt from tax for all 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See generally Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax 
and an Income-Inclusion System, and Abandoning the Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 551 
(2003) (critiquing the equity rationales for the GST tax). Horizontal equity rationales can be tricky, 
because setting up the comparison can assume the desired conclusion. The equity rationale advanced 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s assumed that middle-class folks, who could not afford long-term 
trusts, were subject to successive gift/estate tax, but currently that is no longer the case. Also, the 
equity argument implies tax avoidance, but, in the context of a wealth transfer tax, no tax avoidance 
exists if no intermediate-generation transfer occurs. (The holder of a trust income interest, not having 
a corpus interest, does not transfer either the income or the corpus at death.) Another rationale might 
be that the absence of a GST tax distorts dispositive patterns. But do we know what those patterns 
would otherwise be for the very wealthy? The current GST tax certainly distorts dispositive patterns, 
and it is hard to imagine that any other GST would not. 
 86 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, 100 Stat. at 2717–32. 
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time. This occurs even if the trust is worth $10 million, $50 million, or $250 
million at successive taxable termination events. 
These defects operate perversely to encourage the creation of generation-
skipping trusts.87 The estate-planning bar, which opposed enactment of the 
1976 GST tax and supported its repeal, has shown no interest in repealing the 
existing GST tax. 
D. Limiting Taxable Events to Taxable Distributions 
The first design issue relates to what should be considered to be a GST. 
This author proposes that only distributions to skip persons should be taxable, 
whether derived from the income88 or corpus of a generation-skipping trust (or 
non-trust equivalent).89 Thus, in a trust with income payable to T’s children 
and grandchildren and remainder to great-grandchildren, the taxable events 
would be distributions to the grandchildren and great-grandchildren. By con-
trast, under current law the death of T’s last surviving child is the taxable event 
(a “taxable termination”) with respect to the grandchildren, and subsequent 
distributions to the grandchildren are not taxed.90 
Eliminating the category of taxable termination would accord with the no-
tion that it is better to tax actual outcomes than possible future outcomes. Un-
der the taxable-distribution approach, the tax will be borne by the enriched 
distributee, whereas the burden under the taxable-termination approaches is 
indirect and often indeterminate.91 Postponing the taxable event is not system-
atically advantageous for taxpayers. On average, aggregate taxable distribu-
tions will equal (in present-value terms) the taxable amount under a taxable-
termination approach. 
In addition, although this is a tougher call, the category of direct-skip 
transfer should be eliminated. Unlike a successive-interest trust, no second (or 
third, etc.) deemed transfer from an intermediate-generation individual can be 
discerned. Also, the logic of the direct-skip tax would be to impose a third (or 
more) tax on direct-skips to great-grandchildren (or subsequent generations). 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Congress Promotes Perpetual Trusts: Why? 9–10 (U. of Mich. L. 
& Econ. Research Paper No. 13-015, U. of Mich. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 349, 
May 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326524 [https://perma.cc/835Z-A5NT]. 
 88 In principle, the income tax paid by the beneficiary (if any) should reduce the amount treated as 
the taxable distribution. This result would mimic bequests of previously taxed income: the income tax 
paid or owed reduces the taxable estate. In the present context, the income will be currently taxed so 
that the deduction for the GST tax can be readily calculated. 
 89 In identifying distributees, community property law should be disregarded, and distribution-
splitting disallowed. When determining a skip person, the intermediate generation that has prede-
ceased the initial trust transfer would be disregarded. Cf. I.R.C. § 2651(e) (2012). 
 90 See id. §§ 2611(b)(2), 2612(b). 
 91 Exercise of trustee discretion can effectively control the burden of charging GST taxes to the 
trust. 
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This logic is: (1) not followed by current law, (2) likely to arouse fierce politi-
cal opposition, and (3) likely to distort dispositive patterns. From a welfarist 
perspective, if one’s children are already well off, why should tax policy dis-
courage outright transfers to grandchildren, etc.? The tax-avoidance potential 
of direct-skip transfers is less than in the case of long-term successive-interest 
trusts, especially considering the likelihood that the wealthy are naturally re-
luctant to bestow significant wealth on youngsters with no strings attached. 
Trust transfers in lieu of direct-skip transfers (i.e., separating “layered” trusts92 
for each generation) would not avoid GST tax, because distributions from a 
trust to any skip person would be taxable, even if the trust is incapable of 
providing for intermediate-generation beneficiaries.93 Finally, it is long-term 
dynastic trusts, rather than outright transfers, that raise social policy issues 
apart from tax. A GST tax is an appropriate response to these concerns, which 
include perpetuities, agency costs, and economic inefficiencies.94 
The taxable-distribution approach also offers practical advantages. First, 
elimination of the direct-skip transfer category would accompany the repeal of 
§ 2515 of the gift tax.95 This would relieve the transferor (or transferor’s es-
tate) from paying a GST tax in addition to an estate or gift tax. Second, tax 
planning would be simplified by eliminating the current advantage conferred 
on direct-skip transfers.96 Third, double-taxing persons in the same generation 
would be impossible, as any distribution could only be taxed once. Fourth, 
phenomena such as “out-of-generational-order” distributions or intervening 
interests for non-skip persons would not create a problem. Fifth, and of con-
siderable importance, the taxable-distribution system would foreclose opportu-
nities to tax intergenerational transfers at earlier dates (as under direct-skip-
transfer and taxable-termination options) in order to leverage exemptions. 
                                                                                                                           
 92 An example of a layered trust scenario is one where T creates three trusts: one for the exclusive 
benefit of the transferor’s children, another for the exclusive benefit of the grandchildren, and a third 
for the exclusive benefit of the great-grandchildren. 
 93 Because this is the case under current law, it is hard to see the point of § 2613(a)(2)(A), which 
treats the creation of such a trust as a direct-skip transfer. See I.R.C. § 2613(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 94 Lawrence Waggoner views the perpetuation of dynastic wealth as the main problem. See Wag-
goner, supra note 87, at 3–6. An effective GST tax would serve the same ends as the rule against 
perpetuities, which has been abandoned or weakened in many states. Sub-problems include agency 
costs and economic inefficiencies attendant upon trusts in general. 
 95 See I.R.C. § 2515 (2012). 
 96 Taxable terminations and taxable distributions are tax-inclusive, see I.R.C. § 2603(a)(1)–(2) 
(2012), whereas direct-skip transfers are tax-exclusive, see id. § 2603(a)(3), (b). Also, gift GSTs are 
more efficient than estate transfers. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 27, at 350 (laying out the math). 
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E. Plan A: Taxing Transferees with Reference to Deemed Transferors 
Although at first this proposed transferee-oriented GST tax might appear 
to sit uneasily with the transferor-oriented gift/estate tax,97 the two can be har-
monized by taxing skipped persons on distributions received at the rates and 
exemptions supplied by “deemed transferors.” This general approach was con-
sidered a weakness of the 1976 GST tax,98 but perhaps it is workable under a 
taxable-distribution GST tax. 
1. The Universal Tax Rate 
Since 1976, the unified gift/estate transfer tax credit has had the effect of 
exempting a certain amount of cumulative taxable transfers from bearing any 
actual tax.99 The credit (as opposed to an exemption) results in imposition of 
tax not at the progressive rate schedule’s lowest marginal rates but at the high-
er marginal rate at the point where the schedule tax is exhausted by the credit. 
The current exemption equivalent ($5 million, indexed for inflation)100 of the 
credit extends far into the highest rate bracket,101 resulting in a flat (forty per-
cent) rate. 
The GST tax should adopt a flat-rate/exemption system. A flat rate elimi-
nates the “bracket effect” of the expanding tax base that results from the taxa-
ble-distribution system. Additionally, a flat rate obviates any need to attribute 
GSTs to deemed transferors for purposes of ascertaining marginal rates. The 
only computational issue is that of exemptions. 
2. Exemptions 
Under Plan A, the exemption available to any taxable distribution would 
be the unused gift/estate tax exemption amount(s) of the deemed transferor(s). 
a. Identity of Deemed Transferors 
The deemed transferor would be the distributee’s parent, who is related to 
the transferor. The deemed transferor not only links the transferor and the dis-
tributee, but also indirectly benefits by being relieved of bequest savings.102 
                                                                                                                           
 97 An issue that falls outside the scope of this Article is the role, if any, to be played by general 
powers of appointment under a transfer tax system with an effective GST tax. 
 98 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1263 (Comm. Print 1987). 
 99 See I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (2012). 
 100 Id. § 2010(c)(3). 
 101 I.R.C. § 2001(c) (2012) (applying the highest marginal rate of 40% to taxable transfers in 
excess of $1 million). 
 102 Obviously, if neither parent of the transferee is related (within, say, the fourth degree) to the 
transferor, then some other rule must be adopted (such as exempting the distributee’s eldest parent). 
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The taxable-distribution tax base avoids the 1976 GST tax problems, where 
transferees (in taxable terminations of discretionary trusts) were not factually 
determinable,103 and “phantom” beneficiaries obtained unjustified incremental 
exemptions.104 
b. Accounting for the Exemption in the Case of Living Deemed Transferors 
In the case of taxable distributions attributed to a living deemed transfer-
or, the available exemption amount must be delivered to the distributee. At the 
same time, the amount used for GST tax purposes must reduce the deemed 
transferor’s remaining unused exemption amount. The existence of three par-
ties complicates matters. The trustee would send an appropriate information 
return stating the distribution amount to the deemed transferor, the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”), and the distributee. Then, the deemed transferor 
would file a gift tax return using up any available exemption amount. The 
problem at this point is that the GST tax is a tax “on” the distributee, not the 
deemed transferor. Accordingly, the trustee should withhold tax from the taxa-
ble distribution at the flat tax rate, thereby imposing the maximum tax amount 
on the distributee. If the deemed transferor’s gift tax return shows a tax that is 
less than the withheld amount, the return would constitute the distributee’s 
claim for refund.105 
Withholding is not practical for in-kind asset distributions. As before, the 
deemed transferor would file a gift tax return, but now the deemed transferor 
would also need to send an information return to the IRS and the distributee 
stating the exemption amount (if any) to be set off against the distribution 
amount. Additionally, the distributee would file a GST tax return and pay the 
tax due, if any. If the in-kind distribution is of qualified non-liquid assets, some 
kind of postponement-of-tax provision could come into play.106 
c. Accounting for the Exemption in the Case of Deceased Deemed 
Transferors 
Where the deemed transferor is deceased, the first-tier rule would be to 
treat taxable distributions as additions to the deemed transferor’s taxable estate 
for purposes of computing unused exemption amounts. But this should only 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See Tax on Certain Generation-Skipping Transfers, § 2613(b)(3), 90 Stat. at 1885 (providing 
that unascertainable transferees are determined on a per stirpes basis). 
 104 See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 26.2613-2(b)(3), 26.2613-3, 46 Fed. Reg. 120, 126 (Jan. 2, 1981) 
(disregarding nominal or illusory beneficiaries to determine the existence of a taxable termination and 
the identity of transferees in the case of a discretionary trust). 
 105 Gift-splitting is not appropriate for GST tax purposes, because the deemed transferor never 
owned the amount transferred, and therefore community property laws could not apply. 
 106 See I.R.C. § 6166 (2012) (referring to estate tax). 
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happen if the distributions occur in the same year as, or are triggered by, the 
deemed transferor’s death.107 The procedure would be the same as described 
above, except that the deemed transferor’s executor would file the GST tax 
return. 
In cases not covered by the first-tier rule, it may be that the executor has 
been discharged. Nevertheless, the relevant information should be obtainable. 
If the estate tax return for the deceased deemed transferor is not in the hands of 
an interested party (such as the trustee of a testamentary trust), there is a pro-
cedure that allows the IRS to disclose a prior estate tax return upon a showing 
by a person with a “material interest in the information” on the return.108 By 
analogy to the problem of obtaining historic basis information under the in-
come tax, a rebuttable presumption would be established that no unused ex-
emption amount exists. 
In cases where an unused exemption amount is shown to exist, an issue is 
posed of how to keep track of its utilization going forward. Here, the unused 
exemption amount could be treated as having been transferred to generation-
skipping trusts (existing at the deemed transferor’s death) for the deemed 
transferor’s children.109 Thus, the trustee(s) would replace the executor as the 
person responsible for filing the GST tax return. 
F. Plan B: Per-Distributee Rates and Exemptions 
A GST tax keyed to deemed transferors achieves integration with the gift 
and estate tax, but raises the administrative problems noted above. Under this 
“Plan B,” the taxpayer would again be the recipient of taxable distributions. 
But instead of obtaining exemptions of deemed transferors, the distributee tax-
payer would deploy his or her own lifetime exemption. The rate could be flat 
or graduated. No need would exist for gathering information from other (per-
haps deceased) parties, a withholding tax would not be necessary, and there 
would be no need to treat in-kind distributions differently than cash distribu-
tions.110 
This accessions-tax approach also makes more sense conceptually than 
transferor-based approaches, because there really are no intermediate-generation 
transferors. A distributee-oriented tax accords with various rationales of wealth-
                                                                                                                           
 107 Under the 1976 GST tax, such occurrences would have been relatively less common, because 
taxable terminations would have triggered tax with respect to a generation. See I.R.C. § 2601 (1976). 
 108 See I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1)(E) (2012). Forms 4506 and 4506-T only cover requests by the taxpay-
er (or personal representative thereof), and the Form 4506-T does not cover estate tax returns. 
 109 If more than one such trust exists at the deemed transferor’s death, any unused exemption 
amount of the deceased deemed transferor should be allocated among them in proportion to their then-
respective values. 
 110 As under the estate tax, certain non-liquid property could be given special treatment. See supra 
note 106. 
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transfer and GST taxes: (1) to curb undue accumulations of inherited (and 
therefore unearned) wealth,111 (2) to encourage the dispersion of wealth, (3) to 
reduce the appeal of long-term dynastic trusts, and (4) to achieve after-tax out-
come equity between direct and successive-interest transfers. The transferor 
orientation of the gift/estate tax historically and practically derives from tax 
collection convenience, but the GST tax has virtually no history—or, at any 
rate, no history of success—and lacks practical convenience relative to a trans-
feree-oriented tax. 
An issue to be reexamined is whether outright direct-skip transfers should 
be subject to the accessions-type GST tax, considering the possible difficulties 
of enforcement. The author tentatively proposes that direct-skip outright gifts 
only to grandchildren should be excluded from the GST tax within the limits of 
the gift tax annual exclusion, and outright bequests only to grandchildren should 
be excluded up to a limit equal to that of two gift exclusions. Non-excluded 
generation-skipping receipts (outright, from trusts, or otherwise) of a skip per-
son would be exempt up to such person’s lifetime exemption of, for example, 
twenty percent of the estate and gift tax exemption amount.112 After the ex-
emption is exhausted, the issue becomes whether a flat or progressive rate 
schedule should kick in; and another issue is that of the highest rate. 
As a further inhibition on the creation of long-term trusts, amounts re-
ceived from transferors who are great-grandparents (or in higher generations) 
would be multiplied by (say) 1.5 for purposes of using up the lifetime exemp-
tion, and to the extent taxable, the tax would be (say) 1.5 times the schedule 
tax. 
G. Plan C: A Periodic Wealth Tax on Trusts 
Another relatively simple GST-type tax would be a flat-rate tax on taxa-
ble terminations and taxable distributions, but not on direct-skip transfers. The 
rationale for this tax is not tied to any notion of horizontal equity. Instead it 
would be an event-triggered tax on wealth held in a particular form—namely, 
successive-interest trusts or trust equivalents. 
An annual or periodic federal wealth tax is unconstitutional as a non-
apportioned “direct” tax, but a tax on taxable terminations and distributions 
would be a valid “indirect” (excise) tax.113 Policy reasons favoring a tax on 
successive-interest trust transfers include: (1) it taxes the acquisition of un-
earned wealth because it is borne by trust beneficiaries, (2) it inhibits the crea-
                                                                                                                           
 111 Curbing excessive “accumulations” of wealth is a natural function of an income tax. 
 112 Because a transferor’s (100%) exemption can be used to shelter transfers to a number of trans-
ferees, it is appropriate to limit the transferee exemptions to a fraction of what might be available to a 
deemed transferor. 
 113 This constitutional framework was upheld recently in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius. See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012). 
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tion of long-term dynastic trusts, which violate policies favoring the rule 
against perpetuities, (3) trusts are economically inefficient, and (4) trusts allow 
able persons to avoid personal financial responsibility. 
The rationale behind the tax would presumably affect its design. Thus, the 
child-to-grandchild shift might be wholly exempt (or generously exempted), 
but subsequent generational shifts might obtain only modest exemptions. To 
prevent tax avoidance, it would be necessary to aggregate the trusts of a given 
transferor (perhaps together with such transferor’s spouse) to ensure the ex-
emption is that “of” the transferor, and then allocate the exemption among two 
or more trusts. 
H. Transitioning to a New Regime 
1. The Statutory Transition Rule 
Congress could apply one of these three proposed regimes (integration 
with the gift/estate tax, limited accessions tax, and event-triggered wealth tax) 
to only post-enactment trusts; but that approach is too timid, because the exist-
ing separate GST-tax exemption undermines the very purposes of the tax.114 
Accordingly, an appropriate transition is to subject both new and existing trusts 
to the new regime. Additionally, for pre-enactment trusts, the existing exemp-
tion would operate through the first post-enactment taxable termination. Be-
cause any expectation of perpetual exemption would be thwarted, Congress 
should allow for the termination or modification of a pre-enactment trust. 
2. Constitutionality of the Transition Rule 
The issue, then, is whether Congress can constitutionally eliminate the 
separate GST-tax exemption after the first post-enactment generation of use 
for unaltered trusts created before the effective date, considering that, without 
expiration, such pre-enactment trusts would obtain one more bite at the apple, 
a different set of exemptions (and perhaps rates) for subsequent GSTs, and the 
right to modify the trust going forward. 
In the early days of the estate tax, the problem was framed as one of ret-
roactivity, which was likely fatal.115 But later cases, which have tolerated ret-
                                                                                                                           
 114 Waggoner argues that the current exemption should expire after a certain period, unless the 
trust is reformed so that it would terminate within such period; this makes the modified GST tax into a 
federal rule against perpetuities. Waggoner, supra note 87, at 34–38. The author’s view is that perpe-
tuities are not the only problem. 
 115 The 1927 Supreme Court decision Nichols v. Coolidge involved an irrevocable inter vivos 
trust created before the 1916 estate tax. See 274 U.S. 531, 532, 539 (1927). The grantor (who died in 
1921) retained an income interest for life. Id. at 532. The Court appears to have held that the transfer 
was not testamentary in nature and made prior to the effective date of the estate tax. See id. at 542–43.  
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roactivity if the transition rule is reasonable,116 would apply here.117 More im-
portantly, retroactivity is absent if the taxable transfers occur after the effective 
date, even if the trust was created before such date.118 Thus, a GST tax is not 
retroactive because it taxes current deemed transfers or current receipts.119 
III. REVERSIBLE RESTRICTIONS THAT DEPRESS VALUE120 
The longstanding rule is that valuation for federal wealth-transfer tax pur-
poses is determined by what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller at the 
relevant valuation date.121 This Part considers the extent to which self-imposed 
and reversible restrictions, which momentarily depress the value of equity in-
terests in non-trust entities at the gift or estate tax valuation date, should be 
recognized.122 Specifically, the non-liquidity discount should be disregarded 
                                                                                                                           
 116 The 1986 Supreme Court case of United States v. Hemme involved a transitional rule 
(§ 2010(b)) that prevented a taxpayer from claiming both an exemption for lifetime gifts under the 
pre-1977 law and the unified transfer tax credit under the post-1976 unified estate and gift tax. 476 
U.S. 558, 560–64 (1986) (citing I.R.C. § 2010(b) (1976)). This amounted to a retroactive repeal of the 
prior-law exemption during the transition period. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the denial of the 
exemption, noting that the taxpayer was likely to be no worse off under the new regime than the old 
one. Id. at 570–71. 
 117 The scenario in Hemme resembles the proposed GST-tax transition rule. See id. Although 
future generations may lose the benefit of the current GST-tax exemption, said exemption would be 
replaced by some other exemption or rate system. Also, the trust would be modifiable to accommo-
date the new regime. 
 118 In the 1929 Supreme Court case of Chase National Bank v. United States, the grantor created a 
revocable trust prior to enactment of a provision that included revocable trusts in the gross estate. 278 
U.S. 327, 332–33 (1929). Inclusion was upheld on the grounds that the transfer occurred at the gran-
tor’s death, not when the trust was created. See id. at 339. Also, in 1949, in Commissioner v. Church’s 
Estate, the Court declined to apply Nichols on the grounds that a retained-interest transfer, entailing a 
shifting of possession from the grantor to another at the grantor’s death, resulted in a transfer at death. 
335 U.S. 632, 646–48 & n.10 (1949) see also Nichols, 274 U.S. at 531. Church’s Estate implicitly 
holds that Congress itself can decide (within reason) when a taxable transfer is deemed to occur. See 
335 U.S. at 650. 
 119 In 1928, in Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, the Court upheld a state inheritance tax on a pre-
enactment trust over which the decedent retained a special power of appointment, on the ground that 
only the decedent’s death assured possession by the remainders. 276 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1928). Thus, 
in the case of a “succession” tax (as opposed to a “transfer” tax), a retroactivity issue does not exist 
unless what the recipients obtain was irrevocably fixed prior to the enactment date. See id. A taxable-
distribution GST tax is a succession tax, not a transfer tax. 
 120 For an earlier discussion of this topic, see generally Joseph M. Dodge & Calvin H. Johnson, 
Passing Estate Tax Values Through the Eye of the Needle, 132 TAX NOTES 939 (2011). 
 121 Dodge & Johnson, supra note 120, at 939. The property value for the federal wealth taxes is 
“the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, 
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of rele-
vant facts.” Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965) (estate tax); see I.R.C. § 25.2512-1 (1992) (gift tax); 
I.R.C. § 26.2642-2(a)(1), (b)(1) (1996) (GST tax). The estate tax regulation first appeared as Article 
13 of Regulation 63, Relating to Estate Tax Under the Revenue Act of 1921 (1922 ed.). 
 122 On discounts generally, see George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisti-
cated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 195–204 (1977); James Repetti, Minority Dis-
counts: The Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation, 50 TAX L. REV. 415 (1995). In Cartwright v. United 
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for investment assets held in family holding entities, and minority interest dis-
counts should not accrue where minority status exists by reason of marital 
property rights or fractionalization by gift. Alternatively (or as a transition 
rule), a recapture tax should be imposed when previously discounted interests 
become liquid or lose minority status. 
A. Background 
The principal technique scrutinized herein is when a wealthy individual 
drops investment property into a legal entity, usually a family limited partner-
ship, or FLP. This move creates a lack-of-marketability discount where state 
law or the governing documents prevent family equity-holders from: (1) sell-
ing their shares for full value, (2) redeeming their shares for the pro rata share 
of the underlying investment value, or (3) causing a liquidation of the entire 
entity or a significant portion thereof.123 At this point, the state law of limited 
partnerships—usually some version of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
(“ULPA”)—comes into play.124 Although a limited partner has a right to sell, 
the buyer obtains only the right to receive future distributions, if and when 
made.125 Thus, those without control of the entity would be reluctant to buy 
such an interest. A right of redemption (a “put” right) does not exist for a lim-
ited partner or assignee.126 Finally, the liquidation of the entity requires the 
consent of all general partners and a majority of limited partnership inter-
ests.127 In sum, an FLP limited partner has no right to obtain his or her share of 
the underlying assets, and therefore the interest is entitled to a lack-of-
marketability discount. 
                                                                                                                           
States, 411 U.S. 546 (1973), in a 5–4 decision, the Court endorsed the notion that restrictions on the 
disposition of property must be given effect for valuation purposes. 
 123 Where an equity-interest holder can use redemption or liquidation to obtain the underlying 
investment value, the interest is valued by reference to the underlying investments. See Rev. Rul. 59-
60, 1959-1 C.B. 237. 
 124 See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013). Although corporations and limited 
liability corporations (“LLC”) might also be used to obtaining investment-holding-company dis-
counts, this Article does not examine issues peculiar to such entities, primarily because FLPs domi-
nate the discount-seeking landscape. This is due mainly to the interaction between the state law of 
limited liability partnerships and I.R.C. § 2704(b). See supra note 123 and accompanying text (provid-
ing background information on FLPs); infra notes 125–127 and accompanying text (discussing the 
ULPA); infra notes 142–156 and accompanying text (discussing § 2704(b), which provides an excep-
tion to restrictions on the liquidation of family-controlled entities). 
 125 UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT §§ 102(24), 702. A limited partner or assignee has no right to compel 
distributions. 
 126 Id. § 601(a). A person can voluntarily withdraw as a limited partner, but under the ULPA 
default rule, this causes the person to become a mere “transferee” with a right to future distributions 
but no right of liquidation. Id. §§ 601(a)–(b)(1), 602(a)(3). 
 127 Id. § 801(2). The state law default rule may be stricter. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. 
§ 11.058 (West 2012) (setting a unanimity requirement as the default rule for liquidations of limited 
partnerships). These rules can also be made more stringent, or lenient, by the partnership agreement. 
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A second discount arises from the reconstitution of ownership so that no 
equity-holder has a majority interest. In an FLP context, this lack-of-control 
discount mainly reflects the inability of a limited partner or assignee to obtain 
a steady flow of partnership distributions.128 Current law allows a person hold-
ing a controlling interest to obtain minority-interest discounts for gift-tax pur-
poses (but not estate-tax purposes) by making separate transfers of minority 
interests.129 Accordingly, the creation of an FLP is typically followed by the 
creation of minority-interest gifts. The post-gift FLP interest that the donor 
retains may itself be a minority interest obtaining an estate tax discount. 
The combined allowed lack-of-marketability and minority-interest valua-
tion discounts have usually been on the order of thirty to sixty-five percent.130 
Yet, no willing buyers really exist for such interests,131 so the real value is 
probably close to zero.132 Oddly, the estate tax bar appears to be content with 
this range of discounts,133 and the IRS has been acquiescent. 
Current law is ineffective to thwart these discounts. Under general gift tax 
principles, relinquishing an incident of equity ownership (such as a redemption 
or liquidation right) would constitute a gift or bequest if such loss were to re-
appear as gain to the natural objects of the owner’s bounty. But in the case of 
both discounts mentioned above, no shift of value occurs; instead, value ap-
pears to be destroyed, at least for the period that encompasses the transfer tax 
valuation date. The IRS’s attempts to negate these discounts under a step-
                                                                                                                           
 128 Otherwise, the FLP interest could be valued by discounting a predictable cash flow to the 
present. (Despite this, some non-liquidity discount would still be available.) 
 129 Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202. A similar discount is obtained by converting fee simple 
property into family-held undivided interests. See Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1253 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
 130 See Martha Britton Eller, Which Estates Are Affected by the Federal Estate Tax?: An Exami-
nation of the Filing Population for Year-of-Death 2001, STAT. INCOME BULL., Summer 2005, at 8, 8, 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/01esyod.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VAJ-7JQ3] (subsequently updated to 
reflect data released in October 2007); see also Dodge & Johnson, supra note 120, at 941. 
 131 See George F. del Duca, Rethinking the Valuation of Family Limited Partnerships Holding 
Passive Assets, FLA. B.J., Oct. 2001, at 58, 58 (stating that no market exists for FLP interests). A per-
son having sufficient power to liquidate (by reason of existing holdings or a purchase itself) might be 
willing to buy an FLP interest, but the willing-buyer, willing-seller test disregards the peculiar cir-
cumstances of such a hypothetical “insider” buyer. 
 132 The discounts that are allowed are obtained by reference to such “comparables” as private 
placements, restricted stock, and closed-end investment companies. See, e.g., Holman v. Comm’r, 130 
T.C. 170 (2008), aff’d, 601 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2010); Estate of Kelley v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 
369 (2005). These comparisons are inapt. Interests in closed-end investment companies are publicly 
traded, restricted stock is publicly-traded stock that cannot be sold by an insider for a specified period, 
and entities funded by private placements often go public. In contrast, an FLP interest offers no exit 
options, and no predictable rate of return. 
 133 In Holman v. Commissioner, the Tax Court cited the possibility of a consensual liquidation as 
a factor reducing the lack-of-marketability discount. 130 T.C. at 170. 
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transaction or sham-entity theory,134 or under § 2036,135 rarely succeed, although 
amended regulations might improve the IRS’s success rate under § 2036.136 
A bolder approach would be to issue regulations137 stating that restricted 
equity interests would lie outside of the willing-buyer, willing-seller test and 
be subject to a liquidation-value rule. The basis for this regulation would be 
that no real market exists for such interests. Precedent exists in the regulations 
requiring the actuarial valuation of successive trust interests.138 The market for 
trust interests is also thin to nonexistent,139 beneficiaries have no redemption or 
liquidation rights, and beneficiaries have minimal control over management. 
Under a willing-buyer, willing-seller test, trust interests would be very heavily 
discounted. The regulations ignore these restrictions, as well as the fact that a 
trust beneficiary’s interest possesses the disabilities of a minority interest in an 
entity, by requiring that the aggregated interests in a given trust must have a 
value equal to that of the trust’s underlying assets. These regulations ignore 
both restrictions on liquidity and non-controlling status.140 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Instead of applying a tax-avoidance-purpose test, the courts apply a test that only considers 
whether the entity really exists and whether the gift was an interest in the entity rather than the under-
lying assets. See Estate of Strangi v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 478, 485 (2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 135 Although the IRS may attempt to reach underlying assets using § 2036(a)(1) where the dece-
dent continued to enjoy them, the attack may be thwarted on the ground that the FLP interests re-
ceived in exchange for the underlying assets were full and adequate consideration in money or mon-
ey’s worth. See Estate of Bongard v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 95, 118 (2005). But see Estate of Thompson, 
382 F.3d 367, 379 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 136 The Treasury could amend Treasury Regulation § 20.2043-1(a) in a way that overturns the 
result of Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, but this would only help in cases where § 2036(a) ap-
plies. See Note, Importing a Trade or Business Limitation into § 2036: Toward a Regulatory Solution 
to FLP-Driven Transfer Tax Avoidance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1326, 1335, 1339–41 (2013); see also 
I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2012); Estate of Bongard, 124 T.C. at 147 (applying § 2036); Estate of Strangi, 115 
T.C. at 486 (noting § 2036 does not apply). 
 137 The Treasury has indicated that anti-FLP regulations are in the works, but nothing specific has 
been revealed. See James R. Cody, The End of Discounts for FLPs?, INV. NEWS (Oct. 4, 2015, 12:01 
AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20151004/FREE/310049996/the-end-of-discounts-for-
flps [https://perma.cc/V45G-HSPN]. 
 138 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-7, 25.2512-5 (2011) (codified by I.R.C. § 7520). The predecessors of 
these regulations (instructions to revenue collectors under the 1898 inheritance tax) were upheld in 
Simpson v. United States, 252 U.S. 547 (1920). 
 139 A potential buyer in an anonymous market would be subject to unknown actuarial, investment, 
and agency risks. Any such sales would be privately negotiated, and significant discounts and transac-
tion costs would attach. See STERLING FOUND. MGMT. LLC, ADVISOR’S GUIDE TO THE SALE OF CRT 
INCOME INTERESTS 6–9, https://www.sterlingfoundations.com/pdf/pureftpd.53e7b526.75.0000 [https://
perma.cc/SAU6-37RP] (discussing the process for selling trust interests). A large percentage of trust 
interests are inalienable spendthrift interests. 
 140 An obstacle is the Cartwright decision, which invalidated a regulation disregarding a re-
striction on sale. 411 U.S. at 557. In Cartwright, however, a market did exist on account of a “put” 
right. See id. at 546. Also, a liquidation-value regulation amounts to an amendment of an existing 
regulation, and there is no statutory valuation rule to the contrary. Plus, the administrative law regard-
ing deference to regulations has evolved considerably since 1973. 
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The principal Code provisions specifically dealing with the destruction of 
incidental rights, § 2703(a)(2) and § 2704(a)–(b), enacted in 1990, are largely 
ineffective.141 The most salient of these is § 2704(b), which disregards re-
strictions on the liquidation142 of family-controlled entities where an interest in 
the entity is transferred to a member of the transferor’s family.143 An initial 
problem is whether § 2704(b) confers congressional approval for the giving 
effect of liquidation restrictions that are valid under its statutory exceptions.144 
If so, regulations removing restricted family-entity interests from the willing-
buyer, willing-seller test might be foreclosed. One counterargument would be 
that § 2704(b) is based on an assumption about the underlying law of valua-
tion, which can be corrected by reasonable regulation.145 Another is that a stat-
ute partially closing a perceived loophole should not be construed to ossify the 
loophole. 
In any event, § 2704(b) does not apply to liquidation restrictions imposed 
by law.146 Thus, the lack-of-marketability discount is safe for FLPs that do not 
attempt to impose more restrictive liquidation rights than does state law.147 
Moreover, state legislators can be persuaded to impose more stringent re-
strictions on liquidation than the ULPA,148 which itself was promulgated in 
part to serve the estate-planning needs of wealthy investors.149 Even if a more 
stringent restriction is disregarded, the transferred interest is still valued as if 
state law restrictions applied.150 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See I.R.C. §§ 2703(a)(2), 2704(a)–(b) (2012). 
 142 Treasury Regulation § 25.2704-2(d) treats a right of redemption as a liquidation right, at least 
if other interests are owned by unrelated persons, but such a right would not exist in a tax-motivated 
FLP. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(d) ex. 5 (1992). 
 143 See I.R.C. § 2704(b); Dodge & Johnson, supra note 120, at 941. 
 144 See I.R.C. § 2704(b). 
 145 See id.; cf. O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 81 (1956) (holding that a congressional 
enactment finding post-enactment punitive damages to be includible in income did not foreclose the 
Court from determining that pre-enactment punitive damages were includible). In other words, a stat-
ute modifying what Congress thinks is the underlying law does not itself establish the underlying law. 
 146 See I.R.C. § 2704(b)(3)(B). 
 147 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(d) ex. 1. 
 148 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions beyond those required by 
the ULPA that states, such as Texas, have placed upon liquidation). Because no residency require-
ments exist under business organization law, estate planners can form FLPs in any desired state. 
 149 See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT, 2001 prefatory note (referring to the desire to curb the exit rights 
of limited partners in connection with estate planning). 
 150 Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(c)–(d) & ex. 1. In example 1, the donee acquired a 76% interest; it 
was enough to liquidate the partnership under state law, but not the 80% requirement in the partner-
ship agreement. Id. § 25.2704-2(d) ex. 1. Ignoring the 80% requirement was fatal because the donee’s 
76% interest would have been sufficient to cause liquidation under state law. See id. It follows that, if 
the donee had only a 60% interest, disregard of the 80% restriction would still leave the lack-of-
marketability discount intact. See id. (This result perhaps expands the statutory exception.) 
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Another exception to § 2704(b) exists for restrictions that will never lapse 
by their terms (the norm for FLP liquidation restrictions)151 and that the trans-
feror and his or her family members cannot immediately remove after the 
transfer as a matter of legal right.152 Installing a non-family member as a gen-
eral partner can satisfy this exception, because the ULPA gives any general 
partner the power to block a liquidation.153 In a state requiring unanimity, a one 
percent non-family limited partner would satisfy the exception. It does not 
matter if the non-family member might be amenable to a liquidation, or if the 
partner is not technically a family member—for example, a corporation con-
trolled by family members.154 What counts is that the “member[s] of the [trans-
feror’s] family” lack the “right” to liquidate the entity immediately after the 
transfer.155 If this exception applies, the state law exception is irrelevant, and 
stringent agreement restrictions would not be disregarded. In other words, re-
pealing the state-law exception is not the magic bullet for solving the FLP 
problem.156 
Moving to the next provision, § 2703(a)(2) states that restrictions on “the 
right to sell or use” the transferred property should be disregarded.157 The 
§ 2704(b) exceptions above do not apply here.158 To prevent overlap with 
§ 2704(b), § 2703(a)(2) would not apply to entity liquidation restrictions, nor to 
redemption restrictions.159 The IRS can still challenge restrictions imposed by 
the partnership agreement that purport to prevent, for example, a sale to a non-
family member.160 Yet a restriction found to be within the scope of § 2703(a)(2) 
might still be given effect under § 2703(b) if it has a business purpose, does 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See I.R.C. § 2704(b)(2)(B). 
 152 Treasury Regulation § 25.2704-2(b) broadens this exception beyond the statutory language by 
imposing a requirement that the transferor and/or family members must have the right to liquidate the 
entity immediately after the transfer. 
 153 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (referencing the ULPA provision that requires the 
consent of every general partner prior to liquidation). 
 154 The term “member of the [transferor’s] family” is limited to individuals, and includes the 
transferor’s spouse, ancestors, descendants, and siblings, as well as spouses of the foregoing. I.R.C. 
§ 2704(c)(2). 
 155 See id. 
 156 The Obama Administration’s legislative proposals in this area have not attempted to remove 
the exceptions to I.R.C. § 2704(b). DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 REVENUE PROPOSALS (2012), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/P24S-HFKU]. 
 157 I.R.C. § 2703(a)(2). 
 158 Id. § 2704. 
 159 Id. § 2703(a)(2). The IRS attempted to apply § 2703(a)(2) to an FLP, but its attempt was re-
buffed on grounds similar to those noted in the text. See Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 478. Section 
2703 was primarily aimed at buy-sell agreements involving a decedent’s stock in a closely held corpo-
ration. 
 160 See Holman, 130 T.C. at 192. 
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not amount to a disguised bequest, and follows the commercial norm.161 Even 
without the exception, § 2703(a)(2) is unimportant, because the price that a 
willing buyer would offer would be low, due to an assignee’s limited rights. 
Furthermore, the lack-of-marketability and minority-interest discounts would 
stand.162 Thus, § 2703 is not a meaningful weapon against FLP discounts. 
The last relevant provision, § 2704(a), treats the lapse of a liquidation or 
redemption163 right as a gift or estate transfer equal to such loss in value. But 
the Treasury—without any basis in the statutory text—has created an excep-
tion for when the holder of the lapsed right and family members cannot obtain 
liquidation value under state law or the governing instrument (if more permis-
sive) immediately after the lapse.164 The Treasury should revoke this exception, 
because it imposes a “transfer-of-value” requirement on a statutory provision 
that only requires that the lapse result in a loss of value.165 Nevertheless, be-
cause the law governing limited partnerships commonly precludes redemption 
or liquidation rights (except in the case of general partners), § 2704(a) would 
rarely come into play in the case of FLPs, except in cases where a general 
partner dies holding a limited partnership interest.166 
No statutory provision addresses minority-issue discounts. Nonetheless, 
minority discounts should disappear under any entity look-through rule, except 
to the extent that the equity-holder’s pro rata share of any particular investment 
is itself a minority or fractional interest.167 
In sum, FLP discounts survive IRS attack if the elaborate recipe is dutiful-
ly followed. 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See id. at 192–95 (dealing with the business purpose issue); see also I.R.C. § 2703(a)(2), (b). 
Regulations should be issued that define “business” in this context in the same way that it is defined in 
the income tax (i.e. to exclude the active management of investments). See Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 
U.S. 212, 217–18 (1941). 
 162 See Holman, 130 T.C. at 216. 
 163 I.R.C. § 2704(a). Lapsing restrictions appear to be an issue mainly for corporations and LLCs. 
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(d) exs. 2, 3 & 5. 
 164 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-1(c)(2)(i) (1992). 
 165 See I.R.C. § 2704(a)(2). 
 166 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-1(f) ex. 5; see also I.R.C. § 2704(a). 
 167 Thus, if the FLP owns real estate and the interest being valued is a 30% interest in the entity, 
application of a look-through rule would yield a discountable fractional interest in real estate. See 
supra note 129 and accompanying text (noting that someone holding a controlling interest could ob-
tain minority-interest discounts for gift-tax purposes by making separate transfers of minority inter-
ests). On the other hand, a fractional holding of publicly traded stock is not discountable. 
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B. Plan A: Simply Ignore Self-Imposed Restrictions 
1. Why the Non-Liquidity Discount Should Be Disregarded 
It is argued below that as a matter of policy, the problem demands broad 
and simple solutions instead of the existing complex, incoherent, and ineffec-
tive provisions of current law. 
a. Loopholes Should Not Sully an Already Feeble Tax 
First, the gift/estate tax exemption is extremely generous. In 2016, it is ap-
proximately $5.5 million per individual and $11 million for a married couple. 
These generous exemptions result in the exclusion of about 99.88% of decedents 
from ever paying gift/estate tax.168 With such generosity, Congress should not 
tolerate loopholes for a miniscule cohort of extremely wealthy decedents. 
b. The Destruction of Wealth Is Against Public Policy 
The destruction of economic value is, as a general matter, contrary to 
sound public169 and economic170 policy. Accordingly, tax rules that encourage 
the willful destruction of value should be eliminated. Although some advance 
reasons to allow the creation of, in effect, a family mutual fund, these reasons 
are typically contrary to sound investment practice.171 
c. Self-Inflicted Economic Losses Should Not Be Recognized 
The losses in value discussed herein are self-inflicted, and therefore 
should not be incentivized by the wealth-transfer tax system, a principle that is 
recognized in the income tax.172 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (citing the low estimated percentage of taxable es-
tates within the decedent population in 2015). 
 169 See Dodge & Johnson, supra note 120, at 943. Unreasonable destruction of value is against 
public policy. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 2007) (prohibiting owners from destroying art); see 
also Ford v. Ford’s Ex’r, 91 Ky. 572 (Ct. App. 1891) (refusing to enforce a will provision directing 
executor to destroy property); Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 493 (Surrogate’s Ct. 1977) (same). 
 170 Economic theory posits that free markets are the engine of economic efficiency (social wealth 
maximization). 
 171 The Tax Court often accepts reasons that defy sound investment strategy. See e.g., Estate of 
Black v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 340 (2009) (involving a decedent employee who wanted to force the keep-
ing of employer stock); Estate of Miller v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1602 (2009) (concerning a 
decedent who wanted her assets to be traded according to her husband’s investment philosophy and to 
be managed by her son); Estate of Schutt v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353 (2005) (involving lock-
in motivation). 
 172 Section 83 of the I.R.C., enacted in 1969, provides that manipulative restrictions to suppress 
taxable value of in-kind compensation are ignored, except where the restrictions never lapse. I.R.C. 
§ 83 (2012). Section 83 denies losses for activities that generate tax losses while having no real aim of 
being profitable apart from tax. Id. Taxpayers are denied deductions for transactional casualty losses 
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d. FLPs Are Tax Motivated 
Three facts offer strong circumstantial evidence that FLPs (and similarly 
constituted entities) are primarily motivated to save transfer taxes. First, the 
claimed purpose of destroying family wealth, if correct, is irrational. Second, 
FLPs were not discernable in the commercial landscape until their gift/estate 
tax benefits were publicized.173 Third, FLPs are exclusively used by wealthy 
individuals facing estate tax exposure.174 
Assertions as to the non-tax benefits of FLPs are unconvincing. It is spec-
ulative that FLPs protect donees and legatees from creditors (especially di-
vorce creditors),175 and regardless, such protection is dubious public policy in 
itself. The various investment rationales typically go against sound investment 
management practice.176 The cited objectives of FLPs can be obtained through 
other means, such as corporations, LLCs, and spendthrift trusts. 
Finally, debating whether any plausible non-tax reason exists for creating 
FLPs misses the point. Nothing proposed herein would abolish FLPs or render 
them unsuitable for non-tax purposes. 
e. FLP Discounts Are Like Invisible Ink 
Valuation discounts are counterproductive if no estate tax exposure exists, 
because discounts would lower the income tax basis of family-entity interests, 
thereby increasing future income taxes. For a married person who is extremely 
wealthy, estate tax is readily avoided by the unlimited marital deduction. Not 
surprisingly, discounts are often unclaimed where family entity interests are 
                                                                                                                           
due to willful or gross negligence (or even failure to make a casualty insurance claim). See I.R.C. 
§ 165(h)(4)(E) (2012). 
 173 Pre-1980 commentary did not mention investment FLPs. Thus, George Cooper’s A Voluntary 
Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, written in 1977, only mentions family 
partnerships as an income- and wealth-splitting device. See Cooper, supra note 122, at 181–82. The 
discussion of lack-of-marketability discounts is confined to shares of stock in corporations. Id. Even 
James Repetti, writing in 1995, does not focus on the FLP except as it relates to the issue of minority 
discounts. See Repetti, supra note 122, at 452–57. Tax litigation involving FLPs did not surface until 
the early 2000s. The highest-profile case was Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, which involved an 
FLP created in 1994. 115 T.C. at 478. The early development of the FLP appears to have occurred in 
Texas, perhaps in the 1990s; the FLP was mainly publicized in continuing legal education programs. 
 174 See Brian Raub & Melissa Belvedere, New Data on Family Limited Partnerships Reported on 
Estate Tax Returns, in 2 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX AND 
PERSONAL WEALTH STUDIES 374, 377–78 (2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11pwcompench
2cfam.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XQL-VQ5C] (observing that, based on year-of-death data from 2004, 
most FLPs were held by wealthy decedents). 
 175 Creditors (and other transferees) can only obtain “charging orders,” which is merely a right to 
whatever distributions the debtor or owner would otherwise receive. 
 176 See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing investment arguments used in Tax 
Court litigation). 
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included in marital-deduction transfers.177 The IRS does not object to this, as it 
would be hard to deny the same discounts when the same assets are included in 
the surviving spouse’s gross estate, where the stakes are higher.178 Thus, the 
discounts have the quality of invisible ink: inscrutable on first showing, but 
fully revealed when advantageous. Or, to state it differently (as from the IRS’s 
perspective): “Heads you win; tails I lose.” 
f. FLP Discounts Lack Economic Substance 
Current law allows a lack-of-marketability discount even where family 
members can liquidate the entity immediately after the transfer, because of 
state law provisions that prevent the liquidation of any single limited partner-
ship interest.179 But even where no single transferee has a “right” to liquidate 
his or her interest or the entity, it is reasonable to presume that liquidation of 
the entity will occur when it becomes desirable to do so. No partner in an in-
vestment FLP has an economic interest in permanently maintaining an ar-
rangement that suppresses the value of their personal wealth. 
Nor should the formalistic distinction between family members and outsid-
ers be given weight in erecting presumptions concerning the likelihood of liqui-
dation. Under current law, non-family members can include: (1) entities con-
trolled by family members, (2) objects of the transferor’s bounty, and (3) persons 
sympathetic to, or receiving compensation from, family members. Moreover, 
virtually all FLP interests are created by gratuitous transfer. Furthermore, a true 
outsider would have no appetite for restrictions on liquidity. Perhaps a general 
partner receiving management compensation might resist a liquidation, but such 
a person can be paid off. Additionally, entities can be liquidated ultra vires if 
necessary.180 No outsider or government agency has the power to prevent either 
a legal or ultra vires liquidation. Although an equity-holder might block a liqui-
dation by seeking an injunction,181 it is hard to imagine a scenario where this 
might happen. In sum, the partners have the motive, opportunity, and means to 
liquidate the entity and obtain the underlying asset value. 
No reason exists to respect state law restrictions on liquidation for tax 
purposes. The game in state legislatures regarding federal wealth transfer taxa-
                                                                                                                           
 177 See Raub & Belvedere, supra note 174, at 384–85. 
 178 The IRS’s gain in increased income taxes would occur in the future and would be relatively 
small, because the capital gains tax rate is low compared to the estate tax rate. 
 179 See I.R.C. § 2704(b). 
 180 In an in-kind liquidation, only a transfer of title is required. In a cash liquidation, not even that 
is entailed. Banks, brokers, persons dealing with trustees, and government agencies are generally 
under no duty to inquire into the legality of transactions that they facilitate. See U.C.C. § 3-307 (AM. 
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014) (banks); id. §§ 8-105, 8-115 (brokers); UNIF. PRUDENT 
INV’R ACT § 1012 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1995). 
 181 An unsecured creditor (unlikely in an investment FLP) might also have standing. 
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tion is rigged: the very wealthy and powerful professional groups favor law 
that undermines the federal tax system, and no state constituency exists to op-
pose such moves.182 Also, it is only necessary that one state (or a handful 
thereof) succumb to anti-federal-tax fever, as wealthy transferors can operate 
under the law of the state with the most taxpayer-friendly law.183 Finally, as 
noted earlier, non-tax purposes (keeping it all in the family, centralized man-
agement, or avoiding creditors—including divorcing spouses) can still be ac-
complished, if they are truly important. 
It follows, then, that both exceptions to § 2704(b) are unjustified.184 
2. Possible Legislative Solutions 
a. Look-Through to Investment Assets 
Assuming that the regulatory solution mentioned earlier is not feasible,185 
the cleanest and most effective approach is to enact legislation (perhaps by 
amending § 2704(b)) that simply ignores a closely held investment entity for 
transfer-tax valuation purposes and treats the equity-holders as pro rata owners 
of the underlying investment assets.186 
It is settled that Congress has the power to declare that certain otherwise 
legal but likely tax-motivated arrangements should be categorically disregard-
ed for federal tax purposes without inquiry into motive or substance.187 Con-
                                                                                                                           
 182 The National Commission on Uniform State Laws has not only promulgated the ULPA but 
also the Uniform Trust Code, which contains several provisions that undermine the federal transfer 
taxes. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 107 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (governing law); id. §§ 411(a), 416 
(modification of trust to achieve settlor’s tax objectives); id. § 504(e) (reforming trust to avoid general 
power of appointment); id. § 814(b) (same); see also infra note 183. 
 183 In another area related to estate planning, in recent years state legislatures in states with a low 
level of commerce and no connection to the transferor or beneficiaries (e.g., Alaska, Delaware, Neva-
da, South Dakota, and Wyoming) have enacted statutes that effectively repealed the rule against per-
petuities that would otherwise constrain dynastic trusts. See Waggoner, supra note 87, at 10–11. 
 184 See I.R.C. § 2704(b). 
 185 See supra notes 137–140 and accompanying text (suggesting new regulations stating that 
restricted equity interests lie outside of the willing-buyer, willing-seller test and are subject to a liqui-
dation-value rule). 
 186 Dodge & Johnson, supra note 120, at 946; see I.R.C. § 2704(b). 
 187 See Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); see also Rogers’ Estate v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 410 
(1943). In Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929), the Court construed the “transfer . . . 
intended to take effect . . . [at] death” provision of the 1916 estate tax so as to exclude a transfer revo-
cable by the grantor only with the consent of an adverse party. 278 U.S. at 344–46; see Revenue Act 
of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 202(a), 39 Stat. 756, 778 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
26 U.S.C.). In 1926, Congress enacted what is now § 2038(a)(2), providing that such a co-held power 
would cause inclusion in the gross estate. See Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(d), 44 Stat. 9, 71. It 
was upheld against constitutional attack in Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 
(1935), on the grounds that Congress could thwart tax avoidance obtainable under the Reinecke rule—
that is, a “formally” adverse party might actually be amenable to an attempt by the grantor to exercise 
the power to revoke, see Reinecke, 278 U.S. at 339. A power of an FLP limited partner, together with 
other general and limited partners, to liquidate an FLP is no different from a co-held power to revoke. 
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gress can act with a broad brush to enact per se rules. The Constitution does 
not require extensive inquiries into such facts as whether particular partners 
have an economic interest in resisting liquidation.188 Looking through person-
al-holding investment companies has long occurred in the income tax realm.189 
Such a look-through rule would also eliminate the minority-interest dis-
count for closely held investment entities, except to the extent that the entity 
portfolio consisted of minority or fractional interests in non-liquid assets.190 
b. Operating Business Assets 
In the case of entities holding operating businesses,191 the lack-of-
marketability discount would stand to the extent of its business assets, but mi-
nority-interest discounts should be scrutinized. The discount is legitimate 
where strangers are involved, but it is tempting to suppose that family mem-
bers will act in concert with regard to management and other issues relating to 
the business. This is an empirical question, but it would be too costly to exam-
ine the facts on a case-by-case basis. The author’s intuition and experience 
suggests that husbands and wives are likely to act in concert, but that other 
relationships are often contentious. Thus, the “acting-in-concert” theory only 
justifies combining the holdings of spouses on a per se basis.192 
A more fine-tuned approach would be to disregard all minority discounts 
that are self-created by gift. Current law disallows minority-interest discounts 
created by bequest but allows those created by gift.193 It cannot be the case that 
the gift tax allows destruction of wealth but the estate tax does not. The Su-
preme Court has often ruled that estate tax rules should be imported into the 
gift tax, unless the gift tax statute is to the contrary.194 This approach, which 
                                                                                                                           
Except, unlike a trust scenario, the FLP co-holders are not inherently adverse to the exercise of the 
power—rather, quite the contrary. 
 188 See supra notes 180–181 and accompanying text (discussing ultra vires liquidation). 
 189 See I.R.C. §§ 951, 954 (2012) (controlling foreign corporations having personal holding com-
pany income); I.R.C. § 1293 (2012) (involving certain passive foreign investment companies); cf. 
I.R.C. §§ 541–547 (2012) (regarding constructive dividend of personal holding companies). 
 190 See Dodge & Johnson, supra note 120, at 946. 
 191 According to the data collected by Brian Raub and Melissa Belvedere, business assets consti-
tute, on average, 17% of FLP assets. Raub & Belvedere, supra note 174, at 380–81. 
 192 Such a rule would overturn the result of Estate of Bright v. Commissioner, 658 F.2d 999 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (en banc). Estate of Bright also has had the unfortunate effect of privileging spouses resid-
ing in community property states. See id. at 1001–02. 
 193 See supra note 129 and accompanying text (noting that someone holding a controlling interest 
could obtain minority-interest discounts for gift-tax purposes by making separate transfers of minority 
interests). 
 194 See, e.g., Harris v. Comm’r, 340 U.S. 106 (1950); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945); Estate 
of Sanford v. Comm’r, 308 U.S. 39 (1939). Revenue Ruling 93-12 based its gift tax holding on Treas-
ury Regulation § 25.2512-2(e), which purports to apply the “blockage discount” to individual gifts 
(thereby reducing the discount). Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202; Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (1976). 
The blockage rule itself deviates from the willing-buyer, willing-seller test in assuming a compulsion 
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can be imposed by regulation, makes sense both from the angle of transfer-tax 
theory and the policy against tax-motivated, self-imposed destructions of 
wealth. 
A third possible basis for overturning minority-interest discounts among 
family members is that they can be undone after the gift/estate tax valuation 
event by recombining minority interests through gifts, bequests, trusts, busi-
ness entities, or otherwise. Yet, because such a recombination within the family 
is neither certain nor likely, a better remedy would be a wait-and-see approach. 
Such a remedy is the next topic of discussion. 
C. Plan B: A Recapture Tax on the Disappearance of Restrictions 
Discount-breeding scenarios may be reversed in the future, restoring the 
underlying property interest to full or enhanced value. The entity might be liq-
uidated or an equity-holder might be able to redeem her interest. Minority and 
fractional interests may be reunited or consolidated. In such scenarios, the dis-
count phenomenon can be reframed as a timing issue. 
1. The Removal of the Restrictions Is Itself a Gratuitous Transfer 
The disappearance of a restriction or arrangement that created a substan-
tial discount in its transfer tax valuation should be considered a transfer subject 
to the transfer tax system. Because such restorations of wealth were made pos-
sible by the acts creating the discounts, they are gratuitous transfers in relation 
to a baseline that is the discounted value of the property.195 
The notion of such a tax has ample precedent, not only in the income 
tax,196 but also the estate tax.197 Thus, although § 2032A(c) allows a discount 
on the valuation of farm real estate if it passes to qualified heirs (family mem-
bers), it imposes a recapture estate tax if the property is no longer subject to 
qualifying use, or if the qualified heir transfers the interest to an outsider, with-
                                                                                                                           
to sell, but no such need exists in the case of a gift. The regulation applying the blockage rule to gifts 
should be revoked. 
 195 See United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962); Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 
(3d Cir. 1957) (holding that a lapse, at the time of transfer, of a restriction on transferred property 
increases the value for transfer-tax purposes). 
 196 Although a non-lapse restriction on compensatory stock will reduce the value of the stock as 
compensation, § 83(d)(2) provides that a cancellation of the restriction can result in additional taxable 
compensation. I.R.C. § 83. 
 197 See I.R.C. § 2041(b) (2012) (treating lapse of general power of appointment as a constructive 
transfer); id. § 2704(a) (providing that lapse of right can be a transfer); supra note 163 and accompa-
nying text (discussing § 2704(a)); cf. I.R.C. § 2037 (2012) (stating, in effect, that the lapse, at death, 
of a retained reversion is an estate transfer of the entire remainder interest). 
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in ten years of the decedent’s death.198 A similar recapture rule operates with 
respect to an estate tax discount for qualified conservation easements.199 
2. Scope and Role of the Recapture Tax 
A tax on the removal of a restriction should be linked to the earlier allow-
ance of a discount on account of the restriction. Thus, to the extent that Con-
gress declines to eliminate lack-of-marketability and minority-interest dis-
counts as recommended above, it can enact a recapture tax on the removal of 
recognized restrictions.200 
Even if Congress acts prospectively to abolish these discounts, it can en-
act a recapture tax with respect to discounts allowed under prior law. Here the 
recapture tax would operate as a transitional rule, and the constitutionality of 
such a transition rule would be secure.201 
3. Mechanics of the Recapture Tax 
The recapture tax would be imposed on the expiration, lapse, removal, 
etc., of a restriction imposed by a gratuitous transferor (whether immediate or 
remote) that had resulted in a discount in the value of property (or interest 
therein) subject to transfer taxes on the relevant valuation date by more than 
five percent of the value of the property. It would not matter who caused the 
restriction to disappear or by what mechanism. 
The taxable amount would be the lesser of: (1) the earlier discount or (2) 
the current undiscounted value’s excess over the earlier discounted value. The 
taxable amount would be attributed to the initial transferor. The latter may be 
long dead (with his or her tax information being hard to retrieve), and valua-
tion discounts would not be sought except to save the gift/estate tax.202 Thus, 
an exemption amount of zero should be applicable to the transfer,203 and the 
tax rate should be the (maximum) statutory tax rate in effect at the time of the 
initial transfer. 
The tax should be payable by the persons who benefit from the lapse of 
the restrictions, as they benefitted (perhaps indirectly) from the valuation dis-
counts. 
                                                                                                                           
 198 I.R.C. § 2032A(c) (2012). 
 199 See I.R.C. § 2031(c)(5)(C) (2012). 
 200 Dodge & Johnson, supra note 120, at 945. 
 201 See supra notes 114–119 and accompanying text (discussing transfer tax transition rules). 
 202 Because unneeded estate tax discounts would reduce income tax basis under § 1014, it would 
be irrational to seek them. See I.R.C. § 1014 (2012). 
 203 No advantage should be obtainable in this context from any post-transfer increase in the ex-
emption amount. 
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CONCLUSION 
The three federal transfer tax reforms considered here (which hardly ex-
haust the menu of desirable reforms)204 relate to: (1) transfers with retained 
interests, (2) the GST tax, and (3) lack-of-marketability and minority-interest 
discounts. For string transfers, a hard-to-complete rule would apply for trans-
fers subject to the possibility (or certainty) of receiving back the corpus or 
economic return; transfers with retained powers to alter beneficial enjoyment 
would be subject to an easy-to-complete rule. The GST tax could be modified 
along any of three lines, two of which would reach only taxable distributions. 
Any of these design options would simplify the tax and align it with a plausi-
ble goal of the tax. Finally, self-created lack-of-marketability discounts would 
be disregarded for closely held investment holding companies; spousal hold-
ings would be aggregated for the purpose of testing for minority-interest dis-
counts; and a recapture tax would be imposed where previously allowed dis-
counts disappear. 
All three reform categories possess a common theme of the linkage of 
timing and the accurate valuation of transfers, eschewing the unnecessary use 
of actuarial tables. Also, all three shy away from reliance on property-law con-
cepts and formalism, which have straight-jacketed the development of the fed-
eral wealth-transfer tax system. 
                                                                                                                           
 204 Other reforms should include: (1) disqualifying trust transfers from the gift tax annual exclu-
sion, (2) adopting a hard-to-complete rule for split-interest charitable transfers, (3) requiring inclusion 
of life insurance in an insured’s estate, and (4) repealing the marital deduction qualification for quali-
fied terminable interest property transfers. 
   
 
